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C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128 89examined in the paper (Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the
United States) are unique because of the existence of time series data available for all three
cleavages. Our analyses examine the changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender
cleavages for up to ﬁve distinct party families for each country. Unskilled workers have
become less distinctive in their partisan alignments over time, but other classes have experi-
enced oﬀsetting changes, yielding little evidence of a universal decline in the class cleavage.
Further analyses suggest an important degree of stability in the aggregated eﬀects of all social
cleavages, while also revealing signiﬁcant cross-national diﬀerences and trends in the magni-
tude of speciﬁc cleavages. These results reﬁne debates concerning the possible decline of social
cleavages; implications for research are discussed in conclusion.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In their inﬂuential 1967 theoretical statement about the sources of cross-national
variation in the social bases of voting behavior and political parties in West Euro-
pean capitalist democracies, Lipset and Rokkan characterized a whole generation
of research on political divisions in these democracies as reﬂecting a complex set
of historical processes triggered by two revolutions, a ‘‘national’’ revolution and
an ‘‘industrial’’ revolution (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The resulting social cleavages
produced by these twin revolutions were viewed as having produced stable patterns
of group-based political conﬂict, expressed through modern party systems. The most
important of these cleavages included those based on class inequality (triggered by
the industrial revolution), and on religion, ethnicity, and language (triggered by na-
tional revolutions). Although the magnitude of each of such cleavages varied from
country to country (depending on local political history), Lipset and Rokkan
hypothesized that once a cleavage structure was established it tended to provide a
durable (or ‘‘frozen’’) basis for political conﬂict expressed through the ballot box
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50; cf. Rose, 1974; Bartolini and Mair, 1990).
Social science research on the impact of social cleavages on voting behavior
waned after the 1960s, however, as researchers increasingly looked to more proxi-
mate cognitive, economic, and/or cultural, ideological, or partisanship factors in
developing models of political behavior (Franklin et al., 1992; Carmines and Huck-
feldt, 1996). In the course of this intellectual shift, the so-called ‘‘sociological model’’
of voting behavior (in which the patterning of voter-party alignments was attributed
to sociodemographic group memberships) came to be heavily criticized, even at times
dismissed (see Achen, 1992).
Summarizing the results of a collaborative set of national studies of change in the
role of social cleavages in shaping voter alignments, Franklin (1992, p. 388), con-
cluded that ‘‘widespread reduction in variance explained by social structure has gone
far enough in some countries to vitiate the. . .expected linkage between social cleav-
ages and party strengths’’. In similar fashion, Ingleharts (1977, 1990, 1997) inﬂuen-
tial thesis about the rising importance of postmaterialist values vigorously asserts
that value conﬂict is displacing traditional forms of political cleavage such as those
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voting studies in the mid-1990s, Dalton (1996, p. 345), argues that ‘‘one of the major
ﬁndings from the last decade of electoral research holds that social positions no long-
er determine political positions as they did when social alignments were solidly fro-
zen’’ (see also Lipset, 1981, pp. 503–23; Rose and McAllister, 1986; Franklin et al.,
1992; Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993, esp. pp. 199–200; Clark et al., 1993; Pakulski
and Waters, 1996). Taken as a whole, this emerging international consensus asserts
that voters are increasingly making political choices independently of their social
group memberships or identities.
Claims about the declining signiﬁcance of social cleavages on voting behavior
have, however, been challenged in some other recent work, particularly in relation
to class voting (e.g., Heath et al., 1991; Weakliem and Heath, 1994, 1999; Gold-
thorpe, 1996; Evans, 1999), religion (Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 5), and gen-
der (Huber and Stephens, 2000). Although methodologically pluralistic, these studies
have largely shared the use of newer theoretical conceptualizations of class, religion,
and party systems. They have also applied statistical models that distinguish between
over-time changes in voter alignments aﬀecting all groups from those that have
group-speciﬁc impacts (a distinction ﬁrst introduced by Heath et al. (1985)). The
analyses reported in these studies suggest that claims of declining social inﬂuence
on the vote are overstated, and that the more typical pattern is one of persisting so-
cial cleavage inﬂuence (for recent summary, see Evans, 1999).
The heated debates between the preceding camps remain unresolved. Almost all
past studies have considered these questions in single-country contexts, with the mod-
est number of cross-national comparisons generally involving incompatible datasets,
diﬀerent measures of parties, less detailed measures of class and religion, or diﬀerent
methods of analysis (for exceptions, see Nieuwbeerta, 1995, 1996 and Weakliem and
Heath, 1999). In this paper, by contrast, we exploit a fully compatible cross-national
pooled dataset which recodes national election surveys and other cross-national sur-
veys with information about individual-level voting behavior into compatible mea-
sures across countries. We focus on six countries with signiﬁcant variation in, and
time-series national election data on, three major social cleavages: class, religion,
and gender. These countries (Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, and the United States) represent a range of diﬀerent types of party systems, wel-
fare state regimes, and social structures (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Powell, 2000).
We seek to contribute to the literature on social cleavages (as well as recent de-
bates over the possibility of declining cleavage impact). We introduce three signiﬁ-
cant innovations into these debates. First, we incorporate questions about class
voting—the most commonly studied social cleavage—alongside a broader cross-na-
tional and over-time analysis of the religious and gender cleavage.2 This allows us to
directly examine a possibility ignored in other studies, namely, that trends in other2 In addition to the class, religion, and gender cleavages, other social cleavages such as race and
ethnicity, language, region, union membership, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence might also
be considered. While our cross-national data limit our capacity to carry out systematic investigations of
these other cleavages, this by no means suggests they are unimportant.
C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128 91cleavages are related to (or alternatively, independent of) changes in the class cleav-
age. Second, we apply a systematic approach to measuring the magnitudes of these
three cleavages in diﬀerent national contexts, one which allows us to compare their
relative weight across diﬀerent societies and time periods. Third, we apply a new sta-
tistical measure—ﬁrst introduced by Brooks and Manza (1997)—for assessing the
overall magnitude of these three cleavages on the party preferences of voters in each
country. This measure allows us to assess whether the combined impact of the cleav-
ages in our analyses have changed over time.
We emphasize that the survey data we analyze spans the time period from the
1970s through the 1990s. Notwithstanding the further utility of even broader analy-
ses spanning additional countries and periods of time, the comparative and historical
scope of the current study nevertheless provides useful leverage in light of the coun-
try-speciﬁc focus of much past research. The theoretical focus of debates concerning
patterns of change and cleavage voting, we would also note, centers on the post-
1960s era, enabling the results we develop to help in advancing recent controversies
over the interrelationships of social cleavages and political behavior.
Our presentation is in four parts. The ﬁrst part discusses recent debates over social
cleavages and political change, providing a point of departure for the rest of the pa-
per. Part two describes our data and statistical models. Part three presents the main
results of our investigation, including analyses of (1) over-time and cross-national
trends in the magnitude of the class, religious, and gender cleavages; and (2) trends
in the overall strength of these three social cleavages in each country. Part four dis-
cusses the results, and their implications for larger debates.2. Theorizing the changing impact of social cleavages on political behavior
Social cleavages are political diﬀerences grounded in the social structure of a soci-
ety (Barolini and Mair, 1990; Chapter 9). Social structural inequalities give rise to
groups of people with shared interests or statuses, and when political party conﬂict
provides an opportunity for their expression, social cleavages are likely to be signif-
icant factors shaping the composition and strategies of political parties. For exam-
ple, if the class proﬁle of social democratic parties or the religious proﬁle of
religious parties changes over time, such changes subsequently inﬂuence the kinds
of issues and positions those parties adopt.
Politically relevant social structural cleavages do change over time. These changes
take one of two forms: either change in the partisan alignments of speciﬁc groups or
change in the relative size of groups. The latter—changes in the relative size of
groups—has been the subject of some past research on historical trends in US
(e.g., Stanley and Niemi, 1993; Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 7) and British
party coalitions (Heath et al., 2001, Chapter 7). These are important, especially
for assessing the overall impact of cleavages on party strategies and election out-
comes. But it is the former set of changes, in the partisan alignments of speciﬁc
groups comprising cleavages, that have been at the center of the vast majority of re-
cent debates. It is to that question that we devote our attention in this paper.
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We deﬁne social cleavage impacts in terms of the magnitude of the average diﬀer-
ence in political alignment among groups comprising a particular cleavage. The gen-
der cleavage, for instance, is comprised of two groups (women and men), and its
magnitude is a function of the extent to which the political alignment (measured
by voting or partisanship) of men and women diﬀer. As a consequence of this deﬁ-
nition, the size of a cleavage increases when the average diﬀerence in vote choice
among the social groups comprising that cleavage grows, and decreases as those dif-
ferences narrow.
2.2. Three social cleavages: an overview
Class. The most vigorous debates about changes in the cleavage structure of ad-
vanced capitalist democracies in recent years has concerned class divisions (cf. Man-
za et al., 1995; Evans, 1999, 2000; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1999). Many analysts
have asserted that class divisions are of declining relevance for voting behavior. The
arguments in favor of this view are well-known. One line of research emphasizes that
the general growth of societal aﬄuence and intergenerational mobility after World
War II reduces the pressures that gave rise to cleavage-based voting alignments in
the ﬁrst place (e.g., Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000). In the case of the class cleavage, grow-
ing aﬄuence may have provided the working class with a greater material stake in a
low-tax and low-spending government (e.g., Clark and Lipset, 1991). Conversely, the
rising proportion of middle-class individuals employed by the public sector poten-
tially provides material incentives to support parties of the left (Lamont, 1987).
For instance, the increasing salience of a variety of social or ‘‘postmaterialist’’ issues
may have encouraged middle class voters to support parties of the left (e.g., Ingle-
hart, 1990, 1997). To the extent that either of these tendencies—working class voters
to shift to the right, and/or middle class voters to shift to the left—characterize re-
cent political life in postindustrial democracies, an overall pattern of declining class
voting could emerge.
2.3. Religious cleavage
Although class voting has received the bulk of the attention, religious cleavages
have sometimes been viewed as providing the most important social-structural
source of voter alignments (e.g. Lijphart, 1979), and scholarly attention to reli-
gious-based divides has increased signiﬁcantly in recent years (see Manza and
Wright, 2003). In similar fashion to recent discussions of class voting, however, a
general pattern of secularization (especially in the European context) coupled with
economic growth and increasing social diﬀerentiation is viewed by some analysts
as bringing about a reduction in the impact of religious identity on voting behavior
(Inglehart, 1990; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Dogan, 1995). The presumption in most
discussions has been that secularization will produce a declining impact of religion
on political preference. But this need not necessarily be the case. In countries where
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oppose other aspects of secularization processes, showing increasing political diﬀer-
ences in comparison to non-religious voters. In other words, a shift in the religious
cleavage from one based on, for example, Catholic vs. Protestant denominational
identities towards one centering on conﬂicts between secular vs. religious voters
may still produce a signiﬁcant religious cleavage.3
2.4. Gender cleavage
Systematic comparative research on the impact of gender on political behavior is
in an earlier stage of scholarly development (for examples of the few comparative
studies, see Norris, 1988; DeVaus and McAllister, 1989; Hayes et al., 2000; Inglehart
and Norris, 2000). Clear evidence of a growing gender gap in which women voters
are more supportive of Left parties than men has been found in countries such as
the United States (Mueller, 1988; Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 5) and in the
Scandinavian social democratic welfare states (Oskarson, 1992; Velen, 1992). In both
of these contexts, employment appears to provide one important source of changing
political alignments among women (in relation to men).
Two broad interpretations have emerged in the literature to explain this develop-
ment: ﬁrst, women are more likely to be employed in the public sector, and hence
more supportive of political parties favoring government employment or growth;
and second, working women are more likely than non-working women to rely upon
welfare state programs supporting work and childcare. In each case, the argument is
that working women have greater incentives to support parties of the left (Andersen,
1999; Huber and Stephens, 2000). However, the evidence for an emerging cross-na-
tional gender gap in other countries is uneven. We consider the possibility of a rising
gender cleavage, and also the comparative magnitude of gender in relation to the
class and religious cleavages.
2.5. Interrelationships of class, religion, and gender
Following the logic of our comparative design, there are good reasons to consider
the possibility of inter-relationships between social cleavages (e.g., McCall, 2001).
For example, declining class divisions may encourage individual voters to distinguish
among parties on the basis of other social identities such as religion or gender. Fur-
thermore, the debates and hypotheses relating to social cleavages that we consider in
this paper refer to the causal linkage of speciﬁc cleavages and political behavior, not
to bivariate patterns of association that may overestimate these linkages because of
spurious association scenarios. For instance, if a bivariate relationship between reli-
gion and voting—or a trend in that relationship—is largely a product of the class
composition of religious groups, bivariate estimates that fail to account for class will3 A third type of religious cleavage, between religious liberals and religious conservatives within
religious denomination, is sometimes hypothesized as emerging (cf. Wuthnow, 1988). However, we do not
have the necessary level of detail in these data to test such propositions.
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variate research design that analyzes the net eﬀect of social cleavages on vote choice.3. Data and measures
3.1. Data
To investigate levels of cleavage voting from a historical and comparative per-
spective, we analyze data from a new dataset, the ISCP ﬁle (Nieuwbeerta and Gan-
zeboom, 2000). The ISCP is a pooled dataset containing information on
characteristics of more than 500,000 respondents from over 200 national election
and other surveys held in 25 democratic countries in the period 1950–2000.4 The ori-
ginal survey data were recoded into compatible, standardized measures of key vari-
ables for all countries, and then merged into the ISCP ﬁle. All data are from
nationally representative general population surveys of these countries during the
post-World War II period (Appendix A lists the surveys used in this study). For this
paper, we selected countries in the ISCP data ﬁle with adequately detailed informa-
tion about class, religion and gender over a suitable historical period:5 Australia,
Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. We se-
lected respondents age eighteen years or older for whom we have valid observations
about their voting behavior, class, religion and gender. This leaves us with a total of
152,127 respondents: 17,944 in Australia, 5754 in Austria, 39,874 in Germany,
27,758 in Great Britain, 21,008 in The Netherlands, and 39,789 in the US.
3.2. Independent variables
Class. While a manual/nonmanual distinction has traditionally been used in re-
search on class voting, recent analysts have sought to apply more detailed class
typologies, such as the scheme elaborated by Erikson and Goldthorpe (EG) (1992,
Chapter 2). A ﬁve-class version of the EG class scheme—which we employ in this
study–distinguishes between two white collar classes (a ‘‘service class’’ consisting
of professionals and managers and a ‘‘routine nonmanual class’’), self-employed
individuals (including farm owners), and two manual classes (skilled workers and
foremen, and non-skilled workers, including farm laborers). This class scheme has
proven useful in comparative studies of intergenerational class mobility (Ganzeboom
et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992), and in studies examining the relation-4 For further details of the individual surveys comprising the ISCP data set, including response rates for
particular surveys, see Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom (2000).
5 The four Scandinavian countries, and also France, Ireland and Italy have no information on
respondents religion in the original surveys included in the ISCP dataset. For Belgium, Canada, and
Switzerland, only data for a limited number of years were available. See Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom
(2000) for details. In view of these limitations, these countries were not included in the analyses undertaken
in this paper.
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Evans et al., 1991; De Graaf et al., 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta et al.,
2000). In this paper the class variable also includes a residual sixth class, i.e., a cat-
egory for non full-time labor force participants.
Religion. We divide respondents into three groups: Catholic, Protestant, and no
(or other) religion. In some of our countries (e.g., the United States, Germany, Aus-
tralia, and the Netherlands) there are both signiﬁcant numbers of Catholics and Prot-
estants among the religiously active population. In the other countries, almost all
respondents with religious identities are Protestants (Britain, Austria). In some coun-
tries such as the United States, divisions among Protestants6 have proven politically
signiﬁcant (e.g., Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Wuthnow and Evans, 2002), but for most
of the countries we consider here, the Catholic/Protestant/no religion divide captures
the main axis of religious-based diﬀerences (and note that in the US, the divide be-
tween seculars and those with either Protestant or catholic identity captures one
widely debated religious division; see e.g., Hunter, 1991).
Gender: Gender is coded as dichotomy (male = 1).
Period eﬀects: Electoral eras are clearly important. For example, in several of the
countries in our analysis, new Green Parties emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and
right-wing parties in the 1990s. Further, the fortunes and composition of both Left
and Conservative party families have ebbed and ﬂowed over this period. To capture
the eﬀects of electoral period, we include dummy variables for each year data as con-
trols, thereby distinguishing changes aﬀecting all voters from trends aﬀecting the par-
tisan alignments of speciﬁc groups comprising the class, religion, and gender
cleavages.
3.3. Dependent variables
Almost all previous comparative cleavage voting studies have been limited to a
dichotomous comparison of Left vs. non-Left parties (cf. Franklin et al., 1992). Such
an approach is potentially problematic in that most countries have more complex
party systems in which three or more parties compete for votes. In order to produce
a suitable classiﬁcation of parties that enables cross-national comparison, we follow
the approach of Lane and Ersson (1999) and Lane et al. (1991), identifying six dis-
tinct parties or party families. The six party families are: (1) Left parties (i.e., Com-
munist/Socialist/Labor parties), (2) Green parties, (3) Liberal/Centrist parties, (4)
Christian-Democratic parties, (5) Conservative parties, and (6) Other parties (includ-
ing regional and far right-wing parties, etc.). Note that only a subset of these party
families tend to receive signiﬁcant numbers of votes in a given political system, so in6 While the requirements of cross-nationally standardizeable religion data impose limits on any ﬁner-
grained measurement of religion in the current analyses, we do not rule out the possibility that research
with a more limited cross-national scope may be able to carve out such distinctions. But we also note that
past research on the US (the country with a great level of within-Protestant complexity) provides evidence
that trends and main eﬀect estimates of religious diﬀerences (including within-Protestant diﬀerences) are
generally independent of class and gender eﬀects on vote choice (Brooks and Manza, 1997).
96 C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128practice we focus on the most meaningful categories found within each polity (for
further details, see Appendix B).
In this scheme, Left parties (whether of communist or social-democratic heri-
tage) are treated as homogenous, while Green parties are treated as a distinct
left-liberal bloc in those countries where they receive enough support to permit
meaningful analysis (cf. Redding and Viterna, 1999). Important distinctions should
also be made between center or liberal parties and traditional conservative parties.
We identify liberal parties on the basis of ideology and international co-operation
in the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community.
The prototypes of the modern conservative party are to be found in Great Britain,
the United States, and in Scandinavia, where those parties adhere to free-market
ideological traditions placing them on the right of the party system. Religious par-
ties trace their origins to formal ties with religious denominations, often reﬂected in
their names. In the Other parties category a mixture of ultra-right, ethnic and pro-
test parties are included. Ultra-right parties have sometimes been formed on the
basis of speciﬁc issues, to channel voter discontent, and sometimes can trace their
roots to the Fascist parties of the inter-war period. In Appendix B we list the par-
ties comprising each party family.4. Statistical models and cleavage voting indices
The measurement of cleavage voting within a country at a given point in time is
critical to research on social cleavages and political behavior. Traditionally, simple
bivariate measures using dichotomous variables (such as the Alford index for class
voting) have been used (Alford, 1963). But such measures have signiﬁcant ﬂaws that
can generate misleading conclusions (e.g., Korpi, 1972). Recently, more adequate
ways to examine the relationship between cleavages and voting have been developed.
First, multivariate models that enable measurement of political changes aﬀecting spe-
ciﬁc cleavages vs. changes aﬀecting all cleavages equally are now commonplace. Sec-
ond, recent scholarship has sought to avoid arbitrary or unrealistic assumptions
about interval-level measurement in party choice by using log-linear or logistic
regression models that are appropriate for analyzing nominal dependent variables
(see e.g., Heath et al. (1985) and Manza et al. (1995) for overviews).
In this paper, we analyze social cleavages using multinomial logistic regression
(MLR) models of party choice (Hout, Brooks, and Manza, 1995; Brooks, 2000; Ger-
ber, 2000). In our models, the dependent variable is the log of the odds of choosing a
speciﬁc party family over the reference party family for person i. We evaluate four
types of MLR models, each embedding diﬀerent theoretical assumptions about polit-
ical changes aﬀecting cleavages or speciﬁc groups of voters. The base model assumes
no change in the eﬀects of cleavages over time, and it is represented in Eq. (1):









p¼1 q¼1 r¼1 s¼1
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category; Gir are dummy variables for religion categories; and Fis is a dummy vari-
able for gender. The parameters to be estimated in this model are the constants, aj,
and the b-parameters for the main eﬀects of year (bpj), class (bqj), religion (brj), and
gender (bsj) on party family choice j.
7 Using this base model, we can systematically
evaluate the evidence for trends in the political eﬀects of cleavages using four diﬀer-
ent parameterizations of change.
Our second model is motivated by the widely debated hypothesis of cleavage de-
cline discussed earlier in the paper, namely, that the class and religious cleavages
have a declining impact on voter alignments in Western democracies. We call this
the traditional decline model. It parameterizes changes in voter alignments by focus-
ing on the key social groups that are hypothesized as changing their partisan orien-
tations. Regarding change in the political–behavioral eﬀects of class, the traditional
decline hypothesis is that left vs. right conﬂict exempliﬁed in the partisan alignments
of manual workers and the service class (the polar classes in capitalist societies) will
become more similar over time. This model thus adds to model 1 two additional
coeﬃcients: one coeﬃcient is for a linearly constrained change in support for Left
vs. Right party families (Liberal vs. Left in Australia, Liberal vs. Conservative in
the US, Conservative vs. Left in Britain, and Left vs. Religious in Austria, Germany,
and the Netherlands) among unskilled/skilled workers (treating the latter as a single
homogenous category); and a second coeﬃcient for linear change in support for
these parties among the service class.8
For cleavage variables that are treated as dichotomies in the traditional decline
analysis (e.g., religious vs. non-religious; men vs. women), model identiﬁcation re-
quires that we parameterize only one group-speciﬁc shift in partisan alignment,
where the other group is treated as the reference. Traditional decline in the religious
cleavage is parameterized using a single coeﬃcient for linearly constrained change in
the alignment of religious voters (Protestant or Catholic) with Left vs. Religious/
Conservative/Liberal party families.9 Traditional decline in the gender cleavage is
measured with a coeﬃcient for linearly constrained change in the alignments of
men with Left vs. Religious/Conservative/Liberal party families.107 To identify the model we constrain parameters for one level of each cleavage variable to 0, and setting
one level of the party family choice variable as the reference category.
8 In countries in which Religious party families obtain a larger portion of the vote than Liberal parties
(Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands), we specify the latter as the reference, assuming that support for
the latter better measures the underlying dimension of left vs. right partisan political conﬂict.
9 In countries with Religious party families (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands), we specify the
latter as the reference in estimating the log-odds of support for Left party families vs. Religious party
families; in countries without Religious party families, we specify as the reference Liberal (Australia) or
Conservative party families (Britain, the US) to estimate the log-odds of support for Left party families
(the democratic party in the US).
10 In Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, the equation measuring traditional decline in the gender
cleavage is for the log-odds of favoring Left vs. Religious party families; in Britain and the US, the
corresponding log-odds contrast is for favoring Left (Liberal in the US) over Conservative party families;
and in Australia the relevant log-odds contrast is for favoring Left over Liberal party families.
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rized below:
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The traditional decline model in Eq. (2) is distinguished from the base model in Eq.
(1) by having two additional /-coeﬃcients for changes in the respective alignments
of the service class and unskilled/skilled workers with Left party families (j = 1). For
both coeﬃcients, the linear trend constraint is imposed by computing the product of
the relevant dummy variable for group membership by a continuous variable for
time (Y0) in which survey years are represented by ﬁxed scores.
The traditional decline model imposes restrictions that may not adequately cap-
ture changes aﬀecting the three cleavages in our analyses: changing alignments of
key groups are assumed not to aﬀect choices involving Other party families; and
changes in the alignments of groups comprising cleavages are limited to the pairs
of groups discussed above. If these assumptions are unrealistic, then our third model,
the linear change model, will be preferred over the traditional decline model devel-
oped in Eq. (2). Using as an example the class cleavage, this linear change model
can be summarized as follows:
















In contrast to both the base and traditional decline models, the linear change
model in Eq. (3) is distinguished by having Q /-coeﬃcients capturing changes in
the partisan political alignments of each category comprising the class cleavage.
As before, the ﬁxed score for year constrains over-time change in class-speciﬁc align-
ments to follow a linear pattern. However, because the linear change model does not
restrict political–behavioral change to the speciﬁc social groups speciﬁed by the tra-
ditional decline models, the linear change model consumes more degrees of freedom.
In the analyses below, we estimate linear change models that parameterize changes
aﬀecting the (non-redundant) groups comprising the three cleavages.
The possibility that changes in voter alignments within speciﬁc countries may be
more complicated than that speciﬁed by either the linear change or traditional de-
cline model raises yet another set of complications. For example, if changes in the
class cleavage variable involves only the self-employed and unskilled workers, or if
such patterns of change vary systematically across country context (e.g., if class
cleavage change in the US involves the service class while class cleavage change in
Austria involves the self-employed and routine white-collar employees). These pos-
sibilities are embedded in a forth model we consider in the paper, what we call the
intermediate linear model. This model constrains linear parameter change coeﬃcients
for speciﬁc social groups to 0, while restricting the /-coeﬃcients for some groups to
pertain to particular party families, thereby evaluating hypotheses about the party-
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mediate model provides parsimonious speciﬁcations of cleavage change, and in the
analyses below, we estimate the best-ﬁtting such model for each of the six countries,
developing comparisons with our competing models of cleavage change and with the
base model.12
Finally, we consider a model which imposes no constraints on the structure of the
relationship between a speciﬁc cleavage, time, and party family choice. Using the
class cleavage as an example, this yields the unconstrained change model,


















where the bpqj are the year-speciﬁc parameters for the qth class and the jth party fam-
ily. Because this unconstrained model parameterizes all possible permutations of
change aﬀecting cleavages, it enables informative comparisons with more parsimoni-
ous speciﬁcations of those changes.
In evaluating both global and speciﬁc hypotheses about over-time changes in the
magnitude of social cleavages, our goal is to select a preferred model that ﬁts the
data better than alternative speciﬁcations. In addition to reporting the usual
2 log-likelihood statistic, we use Rafterys (1995) Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) to arrive at a preferred model of social cleavages within speciﬁc countries.13
Given the existence of our multiple and competing models of cleavage change,
and also the large sample involved in the six countries in our analyses, BIC provides
a useful guide because it directly takes into account both model structure and sample
size in evaluating ﬁt. If we ignore such information and rely solely on the v2 test to
minimize deviance, the tendency is to reject reasonable models in favor of artiﬁcially-
complicated models that over-ﬁt the data, potentially leading to biased inferences.14
We discuss additional details of model selection in the results section.11 If (and only if) the /-coeﬃcients are identical to the constraints employed by the traditional decline
model will the latter be identical with the intermediate model.
12 There are, in principle, a very large number of intermediate models that could be estimated for a given
country. As a result, our consideration of these models is guided by three general criteria that seek to avoid
excessively inductive model searches: First, we focus our hypothesis testing on coeﬃcients that represent
the most plausible types of change considered in the literature on social cleavages; second, we use estimates
from the linear change model to screen for patterns of signiﬁcant (and non-signiﬁcant results) in the
political–behavioral eﬀects of speciﬁc group memberships; and third, we use iterative procedures to
evaluate reduced-form vs. elaborated extensions of these models, comparing their respective ﬁts to data.
13 For multinomial logistic regression models, BIC is computed as 2 log-likelihood  (df) · (ln N),
where df is the degrees of freedom remaining after estimating the model, ln is the natural logarithmn, and
Nis the sample size.
14 A Monte Carlo study by Wong (1994) using log-linear association models found that whereas
measures of ﬁt based on the v2 test were biased toward models that included unnecessary (and thus
misleading) parameters, BIC consistently performed better than these and other measures of model ﬁt.
Our large-sample analyses of party choice is similar in structure to the adjacent ﬁeld of comparative
mobility research, in which analysts are increasingly aware of the risks of over-ﬁtting large datasets and
ﬁnd BIC useful in avoiding Type 1 statistical errors (Hauser, 1995). See Raftery (1995) for discussion and
additional Monte Carlo results.
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Using the coeﬃcients of our preferred model of party choice for each of the six
countries, we constructed measures of the magnitude of a cleavage within a partic-
ular polity during a speciﬁc time period. Building from recent advances in the mea-
surement of cleavages (e.g., Hout et al., 1995), we deﬁne cleavage voting as the
average deviation in party choice for a speciﬁc group comprising a cleavage from
the average party choice for all groups comprising a cleavage. This standard devia-
tion-based measure has a number of desirable properties. First, the measure enables
direct comparison of the magnitude of cleavages across countries, even when diﬀer-
ent (numbers or types of) political parties are involved. Second, the measure can be
calculated for speciﬁc cleavages holding constants the eﬀects of other cleavages,
thereby permitting direct comparisons of cleavages respective magnitudes. Third,
the index can be calculated for models employing additional controls.
Following the notation of Hout et al. (1995), we refer to this measure as j. It is cal-
culated as the standard deviation of the predicted probability of party family choice j
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In Eq. (5), P tj is the mean vote choice for the groups comprising a cleavage, and by
virtue of the probability metric, j ranges between 0 and .5, with a score of ‘‘0’’ for a
given cleavage indicating that the groups comprising the cleavage variable do not
diﬀer in their likelihood of preferring a particular party family, while a score of
‘‘.5’’ indicates maximal divergence in partisan alignment. Once we have obtained
our estimates of the magnitude of social cleavages, we use graphical displays to sum-
marize over-time patterns of change aﬀecting speciﬁc cleavages in each of the six
countries in the analyses.
In addition to estimating changing magnitudes of speciﬁc cleavages over time, we
also seek to analyze the overallmagnitude of all cleavages within a particular country
at a given point in time. Our measure of overall cleavage voting is lambda (k),15
which we calculate as the mean of the three separate kappas measuring class, reli-
gion, and gender cleavages within a speciﬁc country and time. In the following equa-
tion, there are H cleavages (h = 1 for the class cleavage, 2 for the religion cleavage,






kt indicates the average size of a cleavage at time t, and a k index score of .1 thus
indicates that the diﬀerence between the partisan choice of a given group comprising
a social cleavage and the overall mean for all cleavages is 10%. Put another way,
k = .1 implies that the average expected political diﬀerence between any two groups15 See Brooks and Manza (1997) for application of this measure to the study of US political change.
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j estimates, we graph k index scores by time and country to detect historical and
cross-national trends in the postwar development of social cleavages.5. Results
5.1. Evaluating competing models of cleavage change
We begin by selecting a preferred model of the over-time pattern of cleavage vot-
ing for each of the six countries in our analysis. Table 1 presents ﬁt statistics for eval-
uating competing models for our ﬁrst three countries, Australia, Austria, and
Britain. For Australia, neither the traditional decline, linear change, nor full interac-
tion models of class cleavage change improves over the ﬁt of the base model. The
decision rule of choosing the model with the lowest BIC index value reveals that
the intermediate model improves the ﬁt of the base model by adding a single coeﬃ-
cient for change in the log-odds of favoring Other vs. Left parties among the self-em-
ployed.16 Regarding the religion and gender cleavages in Australia, BIC rejects all
cleavage change models in favor of the base model that assumes no trends in the par-
tisan political eﬀects of religion and gender. The preferred model of social cleavages
in Australia thus includes only a single parameter change coeﬃcient.17
For Austria, neither the linear change, traditional decline, nor full interaction
models improves the ﬁt of the base model, and the diﬀerence between the BIC index
score for the base model and its closest competitor is 8, representing strong evidence
for preferring the base model. Given that we were also unable to ﬁnd any interme-
diate speciﬁcations that yield evidence of change in the political eﬀects of class, reli-
gion, and gender, our preferred model for Austria is the base model.
Our results for Britain provide evidence of signiﬁcant political changes aﬀecting the
class cleavage. More speciﬁcally, while the traditional decline, linear change, and full
interaction models are rejected in favor of the base model, the intermediate model im-
proves over the ﬁt of the latter by parameterizing three instances of change in class-
based voter alignments (involving unskilled workers, routine nonmanual workers,
and the self-employed with respect to the log-odds of favoring Conservative over La-
bour parties). Regarding the religion and gender cleavages, our results ﬁnd the base16 As an example of calculating BIC, the BIC index value for the base model for Australia is calculated
as 147,565 = 27,824.72  (17,906 · 9.795).
17 See Appendix C for coeﬃcient estimates for this model (and Appendices D,E,F,G,H for
corresponding coeﬃcients of preferred models for the other countries). Note that coeﬃcients measuring
group-based diﬀerences for logit contrasts involving party families receiving very small fractions of the
vote choice can predictably be quite large. While the coeﬃcients can themselves be normalized and used to
derive the j index scores, it is preferable in the current application to multi-party systems to instead use the
predicted probabilities since unlike the logistic scale these have upper and lower bounds, thereby delivering
more meaningful estimates of group-based diﬀerences in political alignments with respect to minor party
families (e.g., using a baseline of 3.00, a logit coeﬃcient of 10.00 translates into a more modest
diﬀerence in predicted probability of approximately .05).
Table 1
Fit statistics for multinomial logistic regression models (preferred in bold) of social cleavages and vote
choice in Australia,a Austria,b and Britainc
2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC
Australia (N = 17,944) Austria (N = 5754) Britain (N = 27,758)
Base model
Main eﬀects 27,824.72 (17,906)/ 11,266.12 (5,709)/ 59,451.82 (27,683)/
147,565 38,160 223,781
Class
Traditional decline 27,821.26 (17,904)/ 11,262.42 (5,707)/ 59,436.20 (27,681)/
147,549 38,147 223,776
Linear change 27,794.10 (17,896)/ 11,235.22 (5,694)/ 59,382.24 (27,668)/
147,497 38,061 223,697
Intermediate 27,810.06 (17,905)/ – 59,414.94 (27,680)/
145,586 – 223,787
Full interaction 27,673.30 (17,806)/ 11,133.06 (5,619)/ 59,059.90 (27,443)/
146,737 37,514 221,717
Religion
Traditional decline 27,817.10 (17,905)/ 11,266.02 (5,708)/ 59,451.02 (27,682)/
147,563 38,152 223,771
Linear change 27,815.14 (17,902)/ 11,255.82 (5,703)/ 59,446.40 (27,677)/
147,535 38,119 223,725
Intermediate – – –
– – –
Full interaction 27,761.26 (17,866)/ 11,206.20 (5,673)/ 59,309.76 (27,587)/
147,236 37,909 222,941
Gender
Traditional decline 27,822.84 (17,905)/ 11,266.06 (5,708)/ 59,450.56 (27,682)/
147,557 38,152 223,772
Linear change 27,822.70 (17,904)/ 11,264.86 (5,706)/ 59,440.94 (27,680)/
147,547 38,136 223,761
Intermediate – – –
– – –
Full interaction 27,804.40 (17,850)/ 11,244.14 (5,691)/ 59,309.76 (27,587)/
147,037 38,027 222,941
All cleavages
Linear change 27,782.42 (17,890)/ 11,225.20 (5,685)/ 59,367.52 (27,659)/
147,450 37,994 223,619
Intermediate 27,810.06 (17,905)/ – 59,414.94 (27,680)/
145,586 – 223,787
Full interaction 27,593.36 (17,746)/ 11,051.14 (5,565)/ 58,847.14 (27,299)/
146,229 37,129 220,457
a Australia: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has a single additional coeﬃcient for a
linearly constrained interaction between self-employed and year for the log-odds of favoring Other over
Left parties; there are no viable intermediate models for religion or gender cleavages (__ is thus printed).
b Austria: There are no viable intermediate models for the class, religion, or religion or gender cleavages
(__ is thus printed).
c Britain: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has three additional coeﬃcients for the linearly
constrained interactions between unskilled workers and year, routine nonmanual workers and year, and
self-employed and year—all predicting the log-odds of favoring Conservative over Left parties; there are
no viable intermediate models for either the religion or gender cleavages (__ is thus printed).
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C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128 103model is preferred over all alternatives by a largemargin, leaving our earlier class cleav-
age change model as our preferred speciﬁcation of social cleavage voting in Britain.
In Table 2, we present results for the other three countries: Germany, the Nether-
lands and the US. The German results show that while the traditional decline model
of the class cleavage is preferred over the base model, the intermediate class model
improves the ﬁt of both (linear change and full interaction models are easily rejected).
The intermediate model diﬀers from traditional decline by having separate coeﬃcients
(rather than a single homogenous coeﬃcient) for changes in the log-odds of favoring
Left over Religious party families among unskilled and skilled workers, and also a
third coeﬃcient for the linearly constrained interaction between service class and year
for the log-odds of favoring Green over Religious party families. For the religionTable 2
Fit statistics for multinomial logistic regression models (preferred in bold) of social cleavages and vote
choice in Germanya, the Netherlands,b and the USc
2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC
Germany (N = 39,874) Netherlands (N=21,008) US (N = 39,789)
Base model
Main eﬀects 88,023.94 (39,770)/ 44,043.08 (20,939)/ 65,590.52 (39,721)/
333,279 164,356 355,108
Class
Traditional decline 87,981.06 (39,768)/ 44,018.82 (20,937)/ 65,565.10 (39,719)/
333,300 164,360 355,113
Linear change 87,928.68 (39,750)/ 43,968.48 (20,924)/ 65,525.16 (39,711)/
333,162 164,281 355,068
Intermediate 87,967.50 (39,767)/ 43,985.12 (20,936)/ 65,562.98 (39,719)/
333,303 164,384 355,115
Full interaction 87,576.22 (39,430)/ 43,698.28 (20,729)/ 65,108.38 (39,471)/
330,125 162,610 352,943
Religion
Traditional decline 88,014.14 (39,769)/ 44,010.86 (20,938)/ 65,584.34 (39,720)/
333,278 164,378 355,104
Linear change 87,891.28 (39,762)/ 43,913.22 (20,933)/ 65,565.28 (39,717)/
333,327 164,426 355,091
Intermediate – – 65,568.48 (39,720)/
– – 355,120
Full interaction 87,724.24 (39,634)/ 43,727.52 (20,855)/ 65,274.40 (39,621)/
332,138 163,835 354,365
Gender
Traditional decline 88,008.72 (39,769)/ 44,019.84 (20,938)/ 65,555.28 (39,720)/
333,283 164,369 355,133
Linear change 87,999.08 (39,766)/ 44,011.66 (20,936)/ 65,555.28 (39,719)/
333,261 164,357 355,122
Intermediate 88,008.72 (39,769)/ 44,019.84 (20,938)/ 65,555.28 (39,720)/
333,283 164,369 355,133
Full interaction 87,920.30 (39,702)/ 43,942.30 (20,897)/ 65,471.26 (39,671)/
332,662 164,038 354,698
(continued on next page)
Table 2 (continued)
2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC 2LL (df)/BIC
Germany (N = 39,874) Netherlands (N=21,008) US (N = 39,789)
All cleavages
Linear change 87,759.90 (39,738)/ 43,816.36 (20,915)/ 65,481.78 (39,705)/
333,204 164,343 355,048
Intermediate 87,967.50 (39,767)/ 43,843.64 (20,929)/ 65,519.74 (39,717)/
333,303 164,456 355,137
Full interaction 87,161.14 (39,226)/ 43,305.44 (20,603)/ 64,695.12 (39,321)/
328,379 161,749 351,767
a Germany: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coeﬃcients for the
linearly constrained interaction between skilled and year (and between unskilled workers and year) for the
log-odds of favoring Left over Religious parties, and a third additional coeﬃcient for the linearly
constrained interaction between service class and year for the log-odds of favoring Green over Religious
party families. No viable intermediate model for the religion cleavage (__ is thus printed); intermediate
model for gender is the traditional decline model, with a single coeﬃcient for a linearly constrained
interaction between men and year for the log-odds of favoring Left over Religious parties. Note that
because inclusion of the additional coeﬃcient from the intermediate gender model yields a worse ﬁt
(BIC = 333,297) over the intermediate class model, the intermediate model for all cleavages is the
intermediate class model.
b Netherlands: Intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coeﬃcients for linearly
constrained interactions between unskilled and year (and skilled workers and year) for the log-odds of
favoring Liberal over Religious parties, and a ﬁnal linearly constrained interaction between self-employed
and year for the log-odds of favoring Other over Religious parties; the preferred model for religion is the
linear change model; intermediate model for gender is the traditional decline model, with a single
coeﬃcient for a linearly constrained interaction between men and year for the log-odds of favoring Left
over Religious parties.
c US: Intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coeﬃcients for linearly constrained
interactions between unskilled workers or skilled workers and year for the log-odds of favoring Liberal
over Conservative parties; intermediate model for religion cleavage has a single additional coeﬃcient for
interaction of Catholics and year for log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties; intermediate
model for gender is the traditional decline mode, with a single additional coeﬃcient for the interaction of
gender and year for the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties.
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interaction models. While the margin of improvement over the ﬁrst two of these mod-
els is not large (1 and 2, respectively), we were unable to ﬁnd a satisfactory inter-
mediate model, and thus retain the base model of the religious cleavage. For gender,
the traditional decline model is preferred over alternatives, but additional analyses
provide little evidence for gender-speciﬁc change in voter alignments,18 and we thus
select the intermediate class cleavage model as the preferred model for Germany.18 The ﬁt of the intermediate model of group-speciﬁc changes aﬀecting all three cleavages worsens
considerably in comparison to the ﬁt of the intermediate class model when we estimate the single
additional gender cleavage change coeﬃcient (BIC for this model is 333,297, in comparison to the
333,303 BIC score for the intermediate class model). This result suggests that the apparent shift in Left
party alignment among male voters is largely a function of underlying political changes aﬀecting
(disproportionately male) skilled and unskilled German workers. Providing some corroboration for this
inference, the logistic regression coeﬃcient for gender-speciﬁc change in male voter alignments shrinks by
approximately 50% from an initial value of .011 when the three class cleavage change parameters are
estimated in the same model.
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but the intermediate model is easily preferred over all alternative models, providing
evidence for signiﬁcant changes aﬀecting the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Reli-
gious parties among skilled and unskilled workers (and also signiﬁcant change in the
log-odds of favoring Other over Religious parties among the self-employed). For the
religion cleavage, the traditional decline model improves over the base model, but
the ﬁt of the linear change model is superior, making linear change the preferred
model of religion. The situation is reversed for the gender cleavage, with traditional
decline being preferred over the base, linear change, and the full interaction models.
Our preferred model of social cleavage voting in the Netherlands includes change
parameters from the three preceding models.
For the US class cleavage, the intermediate model improves over all alternatives
by restricting class-speciﬁc changes in alignments to a pair of changes in the log-odds
of favoring Liberal over Conservative (i.e., Democratic over Republican) parties
among unskilled and skilled workers. For religion, the base model is preferred over
traditional decline, linear change, and full interaction models, but adding a single
coeﬃcient for change in the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties
among Catholics yields a preferred intermediate model of religion. While the linear
change and traditional decline models of gender improve the ﬁt of base and full inter-
action models, traditional decline is preferred over linear change, and the preferred
model of social cleavages in the US thus includes the four cleavage change coeﬃ-
cients of preceding models.
5.2. Class vs. religious vs. gender voting
Using the preferred models in Tables 1 and 2, we can now estimate the changing
magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages within each country (see
Appendices C,D,E,F,G,H for coeﬃcient estimates). Fig. 1 presents j index scores
for each cleavage, country and year in the analyses.19 Our graphical displays enable
direct comparisons between countries and over time, with upward-sloping estimates
indicating an increase in the magnitude of a particular cleavage, and downward-slop-
ing estimates indicating a decrease in magnitude.
Which social cleavage is most important for voter alignments within these capital-
ist democracies? Our results are in line with the expectations of most—but not all—
earlier research, with class being the largest cleavage within most countries. The
average j index score for the class cleavage (.060), however, is only slightly larger
than the corresponding score for the religious cleavage (.058), indicating that we
can expect the average diﬀerence in party family choice for two class categories to19 We use male Protestant respondents who are in the service class as the baseline for our calculations of
group-speciﬁc probabilities, thereby selecting the modal groups in our analysis of the three cleavage
variables. As discussed earlier, we use the coeﬃcient of our preferred models to calculate the relevant
group-speciﬁc probability for each year, party family, and country; the standard deviation of the
probabilities for groups comprising a speciﬁc cleavage thus becomes the subsequent j score.
Fig. 1. Changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages.
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has larger political eﬀects in both the Netherlands and the US (despite an overall de-
cline in the religion cleavage in the Netherlands). Regarding gender, this cleavage is
virtually non-existent in four of our six countries, with evidence of a small, emerging
cleavage in the Netherlands since 1990, and evidence of a larger cleavage in the US
that has been growing steadily during the past three decades.
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Regarding the class cleavage, our analyses reveal the existence of some impor-
tant and hitherto undiscovered trends amidst a background of signiﬁcant cross-
national diﬀerences. While Australia and the Netherlands have experienced over-
time variation, the class cleavage within these two countries shows only little
indication of any net decrease in magnitude. Class has only marginally smaller
eﬀect on voter alignments in the 1990s as in the 1980s (or the 1970s, using the
longer-running series available for the Netherlands). In Austria, estimates for
class voting show less variation over-time and little evidence of a net increase
or decrease.
By contrast, our results suggest a decreasing importance of class in Britain, and to
a lesser extent in Germany. Declines in the political eﬀects of class in Britain repre-
sent long-term trends in which there was a sharp decline from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s, followed by stable levels of class voting that did not return to the earlier,
higher levels of the 1970s.20 Although considerably smaller in magnitude, a pattern
of decline is also observable in Germany, with the magnitude of the class cleavage
tending to be lower at each subsequent election. The US has the lowest levels of class
voting of the six countries in our analysis, and shows no evidence of a net increase or
decrease.21
Given the centrality of debates about the political direction of the working class
in the overall debates about class voting trends, we examine in greater detail
changes aﬀecting the partisan political alignments of unskilled workers. Since
our earlier results provide evidence that class cleavage changes are concentrated
along the dimension of support for Left parties, we present in Fig. 2 estimates that
provide further information about unskilled workers alignment with Left Party
families.22 The estimates graphed in each of Fig. 2s six charts show the predicted
diﬀerence in the probability of supporting Left party families among unskilled
workers vs. the average class voter (i.e. the average for the six classes). These esti-
mates are thus derived from subtracting the probability of an unskilled worker
supporting a Left party family from the probability of any voter supporting a left
party family. Upwards-sloping estimates suggest growing diﬀerences in unskilled20 These results for the British class cleavage appear to diverge from earlier ﬁndings presented by Heath
et al. (1991) and Goldthorpe (1998). Although they use a diﬀerent class scheme from these othe
researchers, Weakliem and Heaths (1999) analysis of election data from the 1930s suggests that British
class voting was at its highest point in 1960 (and preceded by lower levels in the 1930s and 1940s), thereby
providing a potential means of reconciling the preceding ﬁndings.
21 These results contrast with recent ﬁndings of a decline in the magnitude of the American class cleavage
since 1980 (Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 8). Because the current results are based on diﬀerent data
for elections since 1972, these diﬀerences cannot be easily resolved. While this issue merits furthe
investigation, it has little eﬀect on our inferences regarding cleavages within the other ﬁve countries.
22 Note that to accommodate the larger variability in predicted scores for Fig. 2 we have employed a
wider range of values on the Y-axes of individual charts. This contrasts with the narrower range chosen fo
the Y-axes of Fig. 1 (and Fig. 3s charts), so comparisons across these two sets of ﬁgures should take into
account this variation in graphical presentation.r
r
r
Fig. 2. Changing in the political alignments of unskilled workers.
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growing similarity between the alignments of unskilled workers vs. the typical class
category.
The estimates for Britain and Germany show that unskilled workers declining
attachments to Left parties have emerged in tandem with overall declines in the mag-
nitude of the class cleavage within these two countries. Indeed, the large magnitude
of unskilled workers political trends is such that without these political changes, the
British and German class cleavages would have experienced considerably more mod-
est changes over time.
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skilled workers with Left parties; Austria also shows little net change. While the over-
all class cleavage in the Netherlands and the US shows little evidence of net change
(see Fig. 1), the relative alignments of unskilled workers have declined in both coun-
tries. These changes have been more extensive in the US, and the negative values sug-
gest that unskilled workers have supported Left party candidates at lower levels than
the average class voter in recent American elections.
5.4. Religious voting
The second largest social cleavage is for religion (and at least with respect to most
of these countries, claims that the religious cleavage has greater impact than class is
not supported). Returning to Fig. 1, our results provide clear evidence of decline in a
single country (the Netherlands), and this pattern has followed a cyclical rather than
strictly linear pattern. A second country, Austria, is suggestive of a decline in the reli-
gious cleavage, but further examination casts some doubt on this interpretation.23 A
third country, Australia, is initially suggestive of an increase in the religious cleavage,
but similar considerations cast doubt on this interpretation.24
The three remaining countries in the analysis show less over-time variability in
levels of religious voting and little evidence of monotonic patterns involving trends.25
The apparent stability of the religious cleavage within these countries is noteworthy
in light of signiﬁcant changes aﬀecting the magnitude of the class cleavage in both
Britain and Germany, and changes aﬀecting the gender cleavage in the U.S. Also
of note, the average size of the religious cleavage is similar in these otherwise diﬀer-
ent polities, centering around a value of approximately .046.23 More speciﬁcally, our preferred model of cleavage voting in Austria contains no coeﬃcients for
change in the partisan alignments of religious groups. As a result, the over-time decrease in religious voting
is largely generated by the most recent election in our series (1995), in which the disproportionate increase
in the tendency of all voters to support the Liberal party family sharply reduced the probability of any
social group supporting the Religious party family. The subsequent compression in probabilities
disproportionately aﬀects the three religious groups in our analysis, reducing the standard deviation of
their estimated probabilities (and thus the j index score for the religious cleavage).
24 That a signiﬁcant religion-related cleavage exist in West European countries may appear initially
surprising, given greater tendencies toward secularization on the European continent. European
secularization may act so as to simply swell the ranks of respondents with no religion, or, alternatively,
also be insuﬃcient to comprehensively lessen the partisan salience of Protestant vs. Catholic vs. no religion
diﬀerences at the ballot box. Given our ﬁndings, further research may proﬁt by examining in greater detail
further causal foundations of religious voting within countries with signiﬁcant religious cleavages.
25 In similar fashion to the case of Austria, our preferred model of social cleavages in Australia has no
coeﬃcient for parameter change aﬀecting the religious cleavage. Detailed investigation reveals that the ﬁrst
three elections of the Australian series were characterized by unusually high levels of Social Democratic
party family support that compressed partisan political diﬀerences between Catholics/non-religious voters
vs. Protestants (i.e., during later elections characterized by lower levels of Social Democratic support).
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The expectation of most sociological commentary on the gender cleavage is that
women are more likely to support Left parties than men, and that gender has become
more important over time. But with the exception of the US, our results from these
six countries provide little evidence for the growing partisan importance of gender.
Only two of the six countries have statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients
for the eﬀect of gender on Left party choice, and in one of these (the Netherlands),
women are less left-wing than men. Moreover, as presented in Fig. 1, the diﬀerences
in predicted probabilities for women vs. men voters are generally minuscule and only
the US gender cleavage conforms to the expectation of a linearly evolving trend.
While these ﬁndings suggest that it may be premature to expect gender to emerge
as a factor comparable to class or religion, it will be important to test these ﬁndings
in other contexts (particularly the Scandinavian countries), where gender diﬀerences
are often thought to be more extensive (cf. Oskarson, 1992; Huber and Stephens,
2000).
5.6. Overall cleavage voting
What implications do these analyses have for understanding the cross-national
magnitude and historical trends in overall levels of cleavage voting within capitalist
democracies? We answer these questions using the k index which measures the aver-
age level of social cleavage voting for particular time periods within each country.
The results of these analyses are presented in Fig. 3.
These results provide no evidence for the existence of a universal decline in social
cleavage voting during the past three decades, as a number of analysts have sug-
gested. Patterns of cleavage change tend to instead be speciﬁc to countries, with
two countries experiencing net increases in social cleavages (Australia and the
US), three countries experiencing an overall decline (Britain, Germany, and the
Netherlands), and the remaining country experiencing over-time patterns that do
not suggest trends (Austria26). The two countries characterized by increasing trends
have moved from having the lowest levels of social cleavage voting to positions clo-
ser to the average levels of the other countries. In Australia, the overall social cleav-
age grew from .027 in 1979 to .034 in 1998. In the US, the average social cleavage
increased from .025 in 1964 to .039 in 1998.
The cases of Britain and Germany (and to a somewhat lesser extent the Nether-
lands) illustrate the declining cleavage scenario. The overall level of cleavage voting
declined substantially from .046 to .035 in Britain (and from .056 to .047 in the
Netherlands), while declining by a more modest 10% in Germany (from .040 to
.036). These declines reveal the importance of declining trends in class voting within26 This decrease in overall social cleavage voting is produced by a single recent election (1995), and as
discussed earlier, there are compelling reasons to interpret cleavage voting in Austria as instead reﬂecting a
pattern of overall stability.
Fig. 3. Changing magnitude of the overall social cleavage.
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changed little in Britain (increasing .01 from 1966 to 1997), and remained stable
in Germany. The case of the Netherlands is slightly more complicated, insofar as
the class cleavage has ﬂuctuated in a non-monotonic fashion and the religion cleav-
age has declined substantially (but in a non-linear fashion), while the emergence of a
small gender gap reduced what would otherwise have been a larger decline in overall
cleavage voting.
Taken as a whole, a further notable result is the perhaps surprising degree of sim-
ilarity by the 1990s in the overall level of cleavage voting within all six countries. As
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score of .05, implying that the average political diﬀerence for a given pair of social
groups is approximately 10%. Moreover, the small but signiﬁcant trends aﬀecting
Britain, Germany, Australia, and the US has accentuated this cross-national
similarity.27
Complementing this emerging portrait of social cleavages, a further set of ﬁndings
concerns the modest contribution of such cleavages to understanding the overall
sources of voter alignments. Using McFaddens R2 as a summary approximation
of variance explained in our preferred models, we arrive at the following values:
.11 (Australia), .10 (Austria), .05 (Great Britain), .07 (Germany), .14 (Netherlands),
and .07 (US). Taken together, these results are relevant to advancing ongoing debate
over the nature of changes in social cleavage-based voter alignments and their rela-
tionship to other aspects of contemporary political change.6. Discussion
Comparative and historical analysis visibly broadens scholarly debates, but
past research on the impact of social cleavages has been constrained by either sig-
niﬁcant methodological limitations or a tendency to limit hypothesis testing to
single countries. Virtually no previous studies have attempted to test hypotheses
about social cleavage impacts in comparative context using a fully diﬀerentiated
party family scheme and a multi-category typology of cleavages. The relatively
broad scope of our analyses, covering six advanced capitalist democracies for a
30 year period, provides a new perspective from which to address these questions.
While future investigations will be needed to reﬁne the understandings developed
here, we have shown the possibilities for systematic comparative-historical inves-
tigation, and we welcome further work that spans additional countries and time
periods as a means of advancing research on cleavage voting in capitalist
democracies.
It is critical to emphasize, in this context, the relevance of the time period covered
by our analyses to debates and unresolved controversies over trends in social cleav-
age-based voting within capitalist democracies. In particular, the theoretical under-
pinnings of most predictions concerning a decline or displacement of cleavage voting
identify historical factors and novel processes that are hypothesized as emerging pri-
marily during the historical era since the 1960s. These would include the following:
new left-libertarian (and neo-conservative or new right) movements; novel (or re-
emergent) ideological conﬂicts concerning issues of rights, the environment, and
the character of civil society; recent patterns of postindustrial change; partisan vol-
atility aﬀecting left and other previously-dominant parties during the 1980s; and per-27 We emphasize again that more detailed analyses using diﬀerent data ﬁnd a pattern of over-time
decline in the magnitude of the US class cleavage (see Manza and Brooks, 1999). Notwithstanding this
diﬀerence, that research (and the current study) both ﬁnd no evidence for over-time decline in the
magnitude of the overall social cleavage in the US.
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(e.g., Franklin et al., 1992; Clark et al., 1993; Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993; Pakulski
and Waters, 1996). Accordingly, while it could thus be hypothesized that social
cleavage voting within speciﬁc countries was possibly higher prior to the decade of
the 1960s, if true, that line of argumentation might also call into question much of
the theoretical basis for anticipating contemporary patterns of cleavage decline. Fur-
ther research, then, situating the post-1960s era within a longer time frame, while
employing suitable measures and methods for the study of social cleavages, may thus
help to reﬁne scholarly understanding of the historical origins and magnitude of
trends in cleavage-based voting.
The substantive ﬁndings of this study help to advance recent debates concerning
the continuing signiﬁcance vs. declining relevance of social cleavages to voter align-
ments and political conﬂict within capitalist democracies (see Evans (2000) for a re-
cent review). Widely proclaimed assertions regarding the existence of working-class
dealignment and its signiﬁcant consequences for declining cleavage voting within
Western democracies are partially supported by these analyses. More speciﬁcally,
in four of the six countries we have investigated, unskilled workers, traditionally
the bulwark of Left party support, have evolved over time to more closely resemble
the average voter, making their partisan political alignments far less distinctive, and
potentially providing far less incentive for left politicians to develop policies designed
to appeal (disproportionately) to unskilled workers.
By the same token, however, we ﬁnd no evidence for a universal decline in the par-
tisan relevance of social cleavages, including class in the post-1960s era. While some
countries in our analyses conform to the declining cleavage scenario (Britain, Ger-
many, and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Netherlands), others show some tendency
toward a growing magnitude of social cleavages as a whole (Australia and the US),
and one country (Austria) has experienced a pattern of stability coupled with a very
recent increase. This larger pattern is visible in part because we have simultaneously
examined trends among three major social cleavages. This enables various reﬁne-
ments to the overall picture of social cleavages in democracies. For example, we ﬁnd
that cleavage decline in Britain and Germany is a product of decreases in the mag-
nitude of a single cleavage (class); gender and religion-based diﬀerences in voter
alignments have experienced little change within these two countries.
As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the existing scholarly literatures on
social cleavages and political behavior is characterized by a sharply polarized debate
between scholars who consistently assert decline vs. those who categorically reject
such a scenario. Taken as a whole, however, our results suggest an important limi-
tation of these polarized interpretations. Indeed, the clear association between coun-
try context and the extent and type of social cleavage change establishes a pattern of
cross-national complexity with respect to which past debates over cleavage decline
appear ill-suited to understand.
Following an emerging strain of commentary on political-sociological research on
voting behavior (Evans, 1999; Evans and Whiteﬁeld, 1999; Weakliem and Heath,
1999), our results suggest the utility of more detailed and systematic comparisons be-
tween countries as a means of advancing debates. In addition to developing such
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the potential relevance of such factors as nation-speciﬁc electoral systems (Powell,
2000), welfare state type (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998;
OConnor et al., 1999), other long-standing sources of party-based political cleavages
(e.g., Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Kitschelt, 1994), and public opinion (e.g., Page
and Shapiro, 1992; Powell, 2000).
Cross-national diﬀerences in trends aﬀecting social cleavages also cast signiﬁcant
doubt on the other interpretive pole of recent debates, namely, that the institution-
alization of social group-based conﬂict within capitalist societies renders them imper-
vious to any process of change aﬀecting voter alignments. While the class cleavage
has not declined universally, four of the six countries investigated in this study show
clear evidence of working-class dealignment, and the very large decline of class vot-
ing is inconsistent with expectations of persistence within all Western democracies.
Generic expectations of stability also provide little basis for understanding countries
such as Australia and the US in which the magnitude of speciﬁc social cleavages has
increased.
Our results also suggest a degree of similarity in the average size of overall social
cleavages within the six democracies we have investigated. Indeed, we ﬁnd that coun-
try-speciﬁc patterns of cleavage change have lead to growing comparability in the
magnitude of the overall social cleavage: By the mid-1990s, the average diﬀerence be-
tween two social groups in the probability of favoring a given party family was approx-
imately .10. Although such estimates represent a non-trivial diﬀerence in political
behavior (and some pairwise contrasts produce much larger diﬀerences), we would
caution against over-estimating their magnitude. The quite large deviance remaining
after estimating our preferred models suggests the further importance of other sources
of the vote. Given these results, further research and debate, including with respect to
related debates concerning political change (Brooks et al., 2003), may proﬁt by broad-
ening its scope to consider other factors behind the partisan alignments of voters.Appendix A
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Appendix B
Party families and political parties by countryParty family Party nameAustraliaaLeft Communist Party, Australian Labor Party, Queensland Labor Party, Lang Labor Party
Liberal Australia Party, Liberal Movement, National Alliance, Service Party of Australia,
Australian Democrats, Country-Liberal Party
Other The Greens,a Tasmanian Greens,a Western Australia Greens,a Queensland Greens,a
Victorian Greensa National Party Call to Australia Party, Democratic Labor Party,
Australian Liberal Party, Other PartiesAustriabLeft Communist Party Socialist
Green United Greens of Austria, Alternative List, Green Alternative(continued on next page)
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Religious Austrian Peoples Party
Otherb Association of Members of the Social Security System, No-Citizens Initiative against
the Sale of Austria, Czechs, National Socialist, German Workers Party,
Hitler movement, Fatherland Front, Democratic Progressive Party, Freedom Party,
Other PartiesGermanyLeft German Communist Party, German Peace Union, Action for Democratic Progress
Party of Democratic Socialism, Social Democrats, All-German Peoples PartyGreen Greens, Ecological Democratic Party, Alliance 90-Greens
Liberal Free Democrats
Religious Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union
Other Centre Party, All-German Party, German Social Union, The Greys, Bavarian Party,
South Schleswig Voters League, Refugee Party, Federal Union Economic
Reconstruction League, German Reich Party, National Democratic Party,
Republicans, German Party, Other PartiesThe NetherlandscLeft Communist Party, Netherlands Labour Party, Democratic Socialists 70,
Paciﬁst Socialist Party, Socialist Party, Green Left,c GreenscLiberal Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy, Democrats 66
Religious Anti-Revolutionary Party, Catholic Peoples Party, Christian Historical Union,
Political Reformed Party, Catholic National Party, Reformed Political Union,
Radical Political Party, Roman Catholic Party, Christian Democratic Appeal,
Reformed Political Federation, Evangelical Peoples PartyOther Centre Party, Centre Democrats, Peoples Party of the Right, Middle Class Party,
United Old Persons League, 55 + Union, Other PartiesUnited KingdomcLeft Communist Party, Independent Labour Party, Labour Party, Social Democratic and
Labour Party, Green PartycLiberal Liberal Party, Liberal Democrat Party
Conservative Conservative Party, National Liberal Party
Other National Front, Sinn Fe´in, Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party,
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales),
Scottish National Party, Other PartyUnited StatesLiberal Democratic Party
Conservative Republican Party
Other Communist Partyd Socialist Labor Partyd Socialist Partyd Progressive Partyd
Progressive Party (H. Wallace),d American Party, Independent (J. Anderson),
Independent (Ross Perot), Libertarian Party, Other Partya The very small number of Green party family supporters in Australia are combined with Other.
b The very small number of Other party family supporters in Austria are treated as ‘‘non-voters’’ and
deleted from the analyses.
c In the Netherlands and Great Britain the very small number of Green party family supporters are
combined with Left party.
d In the US, third and independent candidates are combined in the Other category.
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Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred model
of social cleavages in Australia (N = 17,944)Independent variables Other vs. Left party family Liberal vs. Left party familyConstant .54* (.20) 2.45* (.15)
Year (reference = 1979)
1984 1.48* (.24) .43* (.19)
1985 .66* (.26) .14 (.20)
1986 2.55* (.26) .17 (.22)
1987 1.52* (.01) .52* (.16)
1990 .33 (.22) .1.49* (.16)
1992 2.33* (.22) .33 (.18)
1993 2.80* (.22) .01 (.18)
1995 2.21* (.21) .95* (.17)
1996 2.36* (.20) .89* (.18)
1998 2.33* (.22) .72* (.18)
Religious group (reference = no religion)
Catholic .52* (.09) .4 8* (.09)
Protestant .76* (.08) .21* (.08)Gender (reference = female)
Male .30* (.07) .40* (.07)Class category (reference = non-la rce)bor fo
Un/semi-skilled manual workers .44* (.10) .06 (.14)
Skilled manual workers .33* (.15) .01 (.14)
Routine non-manual workers .12* (.10) .16* (.10)
Service class .4 8* (.08) .64* (.08)
Self-employed and farmers 2.00* (.46) .44* (.17)
InteractionsSelf-employed · year .06* (.02) ___b
a An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).
b Coeﬃcient estimate constrained to 0.Appendix D
Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred model
of social cleavages in Austria (N = 5754)Independent variables Left vs. Religious
party familyGreen vs. Religious
party familyLiberal vs. Religious
party familyConstant 2.43* (.18) 23.14* (.41) .63* (.25)
Year (reference = 1974)
1985 .34* (.10) 21.23* (.41) .26 (.24)
1988 .21 (.12) 22.64* (.40) .02 (.26)
1989 .06 (.09) 23.23* (.36) 1.03* (.18)(continued on next page)
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party familyGreen vs. Religious
party familyLiberal vs. Religious
party family1991 1.29* (.17) 23.03* (.38) .86* (.20)
1994 .00 (.1 1) 23.16* (.38) .48* (.22)
1995 .06 (.12) 23.97* (.37) 1.92* (.18)
Religious group (reference = no re igion)l
Catholic 2.11* (.16) 2.04* (.22) .1.88* (.20)
Protestant .1.43* (.22) .1.12* (.32) .50* (.27)
Gender (reference = female)
Male .02 (.07) .05 (.14) .32* (.1 1)Class category (reference = non-la or force)b
Un/semi-skilled manual workers .44* (.1 1) .25 (.32) .10 (.20)
Skilled manual workers .61* (.12) .03 (.30) .61* (.18)
Routine non-manual workers .08 (.10) .83* (.19) .27 (.17)
Service class .32* (.10) .97* (.17) .02 (.16)
Self-employed and farmers .1.82* (.13) .1.13* (.33) .30 (.17)a An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).Appendix E
Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred model
of social cleavages in Britain (N = 27,758)Independent variables Cons. vs. Left
party familyOther vs. Left
party familyLiberal vs. Left
party familyConstant .70* (.07) 4.29* (.35) 2.17* (.11)
Year (reference = 1966)
1970 .05 (.08) .67 (.43) .10 (.15)
1974 .22* (.08) 1.92* (.36) 1.12* (.10)
1979 .67* (.08) 1.26* (.39) 1.01* (.13)
1983 .67* (.07) 1.35* (.37) 1.57* (.1 1)
1985 .04 (.09) 1.02* (.40) .63* (.13)
1986 .19* (.09) 1.66* (.38) .66* (.13)
1987 .61* (.07) 1.30* (.36) 1.53* (.1 1)
1988 .33* (.08) 2.12* (.35) .20 (.13)
1989 .52* (.08) 3.18* (.34) .60* (.12)
1990 .13* (.10) 2.77* (.36) .04 (.16)
1991 .41* (.09) 2.12* (.37) 1.00* (.14)
1992 .48* (.10) 2.42* (.37) 1.11* (.14)
1993 .29* (.09) 2.15* (.37) .86* (.14)
1994 .08 (.10) 1.94* (.38) .82* (.14)
1995 .19 (.10) 1.74* (.38) .84* (.14)
1997 .07 (.10) 1.97* (.38) .57* (.15)
Religious group (reference = no religion)
Catholic .22* (.05) .78* (.13) .35* (.07)
Protestant .57* (.03) .16* (.07) .35* (.04)(continued on next page)

















)Appendix E (continued)Independent variables Cons. vs. Left
party familyOther vs. Left
party familyLiberal vs. Left
party familyGender (reference = female)
Male .04 (.03) .22* (.07) .14* (.04)Class category (reference = non-labor force)
Un/semi-skilled manual workers .85* (.12) .01 (.12) .15* (.07)
Skilled manual workers .62* (.05) .11 (.11) .34* (.06)
Routine non-manual workers .18 (.11) .36* (.11) .49* (.06)
Service class .70* (.04) .43* (.10) .81* (.05)
Self-employed and farmers 1.52* (.18) .61* (.18) .53* (.11)InteractionsUn/semi-skilled manual worker · year .02* (.01) __b __bRoutine non-manual workers · year .01* (<.01) __b __bSelf-employed · year .02* (.01) __b __b
a An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).
b Coeﬃcient estimate constrained to 0.
Appendix F
Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred model







party familyConstant .92* (.07) 24.83* (.15) 2.43* (.22) 1.73* (.14
Year (reference = 1969)
1975 .09 (.08) 16.12* (<.01) 1.37* (.38) .99* (.15
1976 .03 (.08) 16.05* (<.01) .22 (.28) 1.26* (.15
1977 .06 (.08) 16.12* (<.01) .84* (.34) .82* (.16
1978 .00 (.07) 16.09* (<.01) .75* (.21) 1.00* (.15
1979 .07 (.07) 16.16* (<.01) 1.19* (.31) .69* (.15
1980 .04 (.06) 23.51* (.16) 1.43* (.27) 1.17* (.14
1982 .62* (.07) 24.18* (.16) 1.57* (.37) .90* (.15
1984 .19* (.08) 24.41* (.16) 1.80* (.42) .16 (.17)
1986 .00 (.08) 24.49* (.16) 1.38* (.38) .72* (.16
1987 .06 (.10) 24.19* (.16) .52 (.39) .70* (.19
1988 .13 (.08) 24.35* (.17) .14 (.27) .58* (.17
1990 .09 (.08) 24.42* (.16) .33 (.24) .96* (.15
1991 .32* (.08) 23.80* (.17) .23 (.26) 1.03* (.15
1992 .19* (.08) 24.20* (.17) .21 (.23) .81* (.15
1994 .14 (.08) 24.65* (.16) 1.05* (.22) .89* (.16
1996 .26* (.08) 24.22* (.16) .03 (.24) .46* (.16
1998 .15 (.08) 24.00* (.17) .60* (.23) .01 (.17)
Religious group (reference = no religion)
Catholic 1.39* (.04) 1.56* (.07) 1.20* (.11) 1.31* (.05
Protestant .52* (.04) .87* (.06) .84* (.10) .35* (.06(continued on next page)







party familyGender (reference = female)
Male .03 (.03) .19* (.08) .43* (.08) .04 (.04)
Class category (reference = -labor force)non
Un/semi-skilled manual
workers.88* (.09) .31* (.08) .50* (.11) .18* (.07)Skilled manual workers .85* (.12) .03 (.11) .45* (.15) .07 (.08)
Routine non-manual
workers.06 (.04) .34* (.08) .26 (.15) .37* (.06)Service Class .04 (.03) .05 (.24) .20 (.12) .68* (.05)
Self-employed and
farmers1.31* (.07) .59* (.14) .20 (.19) .12 (.08)InteractionsUn/semi-skilled manual
worker · year.02* ( < .01) __b __b __bSkilled manual
worker · year.03* (.01) __b __b __bService class · year __b .03* (.01) __b __ba An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).
b Coeﬃcient estimate constrained to 0.Appendix G
Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred mode
of social cleavages in Netherlands (N = 21,008)Independent variables Other vs. Left
party familyLiberal vs. Left party
familyLiberal vs.
Religious party familyConstant 1.50* (.10) 2.87* (.35) 1.11* (.10)
Year (reference =1970)
1971 .17 (.13) .76 (.42) .43* (.13)
1972 .08 (.09) 1.31* (.34) .33* (.10)
1974 .55* (.11) 1.57* (.38) .21 (.12)
1977 .30* (.08) .87* (.35) .08 (.09)
1979 .31* (.14) .08 (.66) .12 (.13)
1981 .14 (.13) .33 (.53) .13 (.13)
1982 .36* (.13) .32 (.56) .18 (.13)
1985 .28* (.11) 1.99* (.36) .06 (.11)
1986 .06 (.13) 1.02* (.44) .45* (.14)
1989 .10 (.15) 1.04* (.45) .59* (.15)
1990 .64* (.13) 2.59* (.36) .33* (.12)
1994 .19 (.16) 3.73* (.37) .58* (.15)
1996 .04 (.18) 3.51* (.39) .57* (.17)
1998 .45* (.16) 3.58* (.38) .34* (.16)(continued on next page)
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party familyLiberal vs. Left party
familyLiberal vs.
Religious party familyReligious group (reference = no religion)
Catholic 3.39* (.12) 1.50* (.29) 2.55* (.13)
Protestant 2.51* (.12) 1.36* (.30) 2.06* (.13)
Gender (reference = female)
Male .26* (.08) .29* (.08) .05 (.04)
Class category (reference = non-labor force)
Un/semi-skilled manual
workers.32* (.07) .32* (.16) .54* (.15)Skilled manual workers .46* (.07) .66* (.15) .65* (.15)
Routine non-manual
workers.05 (.06) .17 (.13) .39* (.18)Service class .19* (.06) .31* (.10) .52* (.05)
Self-employed and
farmers1.22* (.11) 1.83* (.45) .29* (.08)InteractionsUn/semi-skilled manual
worker · year__b __b .03* (<.01)Skilled manual
workers · year__b __b .03* (<.01)Self-employed · year __b .12* (.03) __b
Male · year .01* (<.01) __b __b
Catholic · year .04* (<.01) .03* (.01) .02* (<.01)
Protestant · year <.01 (<.01) .04* (.01) <.01 (<.01)a An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).
b Coeﬃcient estimate constrained to 0.Appendix H
Multinomial logistic regression coeﬃcientsa (SE in parentheses) for preferred model
of social cleavages in the US (N = 39,789)Independent variables Liberal vs. Cons. party family Other vs. Cons. party familyConstant 1.63* (.07) 4.81* (.71)
Year (reference = 1964)
1966 .28* (.11) 38.50 (>.01)
1968 1.00* (.08) 3.97* (.71)
1970 .70* (.20) 2.01* (.74)
1972 1.32* (.08) 2.01* (.73)
1973 1.49* (.08) 2.57* (.73)
1974 1.49* (.07) 2.85* (.72)
1975 1.34* (.08) 2.78* (.72)
1976 1.29* (.08) 3.22* (.72)(continued on next page)
C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128 125Appendix H (continued)Independent variables Liberal vs. Cons. party family Other vs. Cons. party family1977 .59* (.08) 1.92* (.72)
1978 .73* (.08) 2.55* (.73)
1980 .64* (.08) 2.53* (.73)
1982 .64* (.08) 2.47* (.73)
1983 .92* (.08) 2.00* (.74)
1984 .94* (.08) 2.12* (.73)
1985 1.37* (.08) 1.96* (.73)
1986 1.34* (.09) 2.12* (.73)
1987 .90* (.08) 2.29* (.73)
1988 1.40* (.09) 2.45* (.73)
1989 1.13* (.09) 2.31* (.72)
1990 1.49* (.09) 2.10* (.73)
1991 1.43* (.09) 2.10* (.73)
1993 .61* (.09) 4.67* (.73)
1994 .50* (.08) 4.65* (.71)
1996 .50* (.08) 4.46* (.71)
1998 .12* (.08) 4.45* (.71)
Religious group (reference = no religion)
Catholic .23* (.06) .71* (.07)
Protestant .71* (.04) .79* (.06)
Gender (reference = female)
Male .02 (.05) .22* (.05)
Class category (reference = non-labor force)
Un/semi-skilled manual workers .01 (.10) .49* (.08)
Skilled manual workers .35* (.10) .45* (.08)
Routine non-manual workers .22* (.08) .25* (.07)
Service class .05 (.07) .08 (.06)
Self-employed and farmers 2.94* (.47) .10 (.10)InteractionsUn/semi-skilled manual
workers · year.01* (<.01) __bSkilled manual workers · year .01* (<.01) __b
Male · year .01* (<.01) __b
Catholic · year .01* (<.01) __ba An asterisk next to a coeﬃcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).
b Coeﬃcient estimate constrained to 0.References
Achen, C.H., 1992. Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression: breaking the iron
triangle in voting research. Political Behavior 14, 195–211.
Alford, R.R., 1963. Party and Society. Rand McNally, Chicago.
Andersen, K., 1999. The gender gap and experiences with the welfare state. PS: Political Science and
Politics 32, 17–19.
Bartolini, S., Mair, P., 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
126 C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128Brooks, C., 2000. Civil rights liberalism and the suppression of a republican political realignment in the
US, 1972–1996. American Sociological Review 65, 482–505.
Brooks, C., Manza, J., 1997. Social cleavages and political alignments: US presidential elections, 1960–
1992. American Sociological Review 62, 937–946.
Brooks, C., Manza, J., Bolzendahl, C., 2003. Voting behavior and political sociology: theories, debates,
and future directions. Research in Political Sociology, 137–173.
Carmines, E.G., Huckfeldt, R., 1996. Political behavior: an overview. In: Goodin, R.E., Klingemann,
H.-D. (Eds.), The New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press, New York, pp.
223–254.
Clark, T.N., Lipset, S.M., 1991. Are social classes dying? International Sociology 8, 397–410.
Clark, T.N., Lipset, S.M., Rempel, M., 1993. The declining political signiﬁcance of social class.
International Sociology 8, 293–316.
Dalton, R.J., 1996. Comparative politics: micro-behavioral perspectives. In: Goodin, R.E., Klingemann,
H.-D. (Eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 336–352.
Dalton, R.J., Wattenberg, M.P., 1993. The not so simple act of voting. In: Finifter, A. (Ed.), Political
Science: The State of the Discipline II. American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, pp.
193–218.
De Graaf, N.D., Nieuwbeerta, P., Heath, A., 1995. Class mobility and political preference: individual and
contextual eﬀects. American Journal of Sociology 100, 997–1027.
DeVaus, D., McAllister, I., 1989. The changing politics of women: gender and political alignment in 11
nations. European Journal of Political Research 17, 242–262.
Dogan, M., 1995. Erosion of class voting and religious voting in western europe. International Social
Science Journal 47, 525–538.
Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J.H., 1992. The Constant Flux. The Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Esping-Andersen, G., 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Evans, G. (Ed.), 1999. The End of Class Politics. Oxford University Press, New York.
Evans, G., 2000. The continued signiﬁcance of class voting. Annual Review of Political Science 3, 401–417.
Evans, G., et al., 1991. Modelling the trends in the class/party relationship. Electoral Studies 10, 99–117.
Evans, G., Whiteﬁeld, S., 1999. The emergence of class politics and class voting in post-communist Russia.
In: Evans, G. (Ed.), The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. Oxford
University Press, New York, pp. 254–277.
Franklin, M., 1992. The Decline of Cleavage Politics. In: Franklin, M., Mackie, T., Valen, H. (Eds.),
Electoral Change. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 383–405.
Franklin, M., Mackie, T., Valen, H. (Eds.), 1992. Electoral Change. Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Ganzeboom, H.B.G., Luijkx, R., Treiman, D.J., 1989. Intergenerational class mobility in comparative
perspective. Research in Social Stratiﬁcation and Mobility 8, 3–84.
Gerber, T., 2000. Market, state, or dont know? Education, economic ideology, and voting in
contemporary Russia. Social Forces 79, 477–521.
Goldthorpe, J., 1996. Class and politics in advanced industrial societies. In: Lee, D.J., Turner, B.S. (Eds.),
Conﬂicts About Class, pp. 196–208.
Goldthorpe, J., 1998. Modeling the pattern of class voting in British elections, 1964–1992. In: Evans, G.
(Ed.), The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. Oxford University Press, New
York, pp. 60–82.
Hauser, R., 1995. Better rules for better decisions. Sociological Methodology 25, 175–183.
Hayes, B.C., McAllister, I., Studlar, D.T., 2000. Gender, postmaterialism, and feminism in comparative
perspective. International Political Science Review 21, 425–439.
Heath, A., Jowell, R., Curtice, J., 1985. How Britain Votes. Pergamon, London.
Heath, A., et al., 1991. Understanding Political Change: The British Voter, 1964–87. Pergamon, London.
Heath, A., Jowell, R., Curtice, J., 2001. The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices.
Oxford University Press, New York.
Hout, M., Brooks, C., Manza, J., 1995. The democratic class struggle in the United States, 1948–1992.
American Sociological Review 60, 805–828.
C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128 127Huber, E., Stephens, J., 2000. Partisan governance, womens employment, and the social democratic
service state. American Sociological Review 65, 323–342.
Hunter, J.D., 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Deﬁne America. Basic Books, New York.
Inglehart, R., 1977. The Silent Revolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Inglehart, R., 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ.
Inglehart, R., 1997. Modernization and Post-Modernization. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Inglehart, R., Norris, P., 2000. The developmental theory of the gender gap: womens and mens voting
behavior in global perspective. International Political Science Review 21, 441–463.
Kitschelt, H., 1994. Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Korpi, W., 1972. Some problems in the measurement of class voting. American Journal of Sociology 78,
627–642.
Korpi, W., Palme, J., 1998. The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: welfare state
institutions, inequality, and poverty in the western countries. American Sociological Review 63, 661–
687.
Lamont, M., 1987. Cultural capital and the liberal political attitudes of professionals: comment on Brint.
American Journal of Sociology 92, 1501–1506.
Lane, J.-E., Ersson, S., 1991. Politics and Society in Western Europe, 2nd ed. Sage Publications, Thousand
Oaks.
Lane, J.-E., Ersson, S., 1999. Politics and Society in Western Europe, 4th ed. Sage Publications, Thousand
Oaks.
Leege, D., Kellstedt, L. (Eds.), 1993. Rediscovering the religious factor in American politics. M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk, NY.
Lijphart, A., 1979. Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting. American Political Science Review 73,
442–458.
Lipset, S. Martin., 1981 [1960]. Political Man (expanded ed.) Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Lipset, S.M., Rokkan, S., 1967. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction.
In: Lipset, S.M., Rokkan, S. (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Free Press, New York, pp.
1–64.
Manza, J., Brooks, C., 1999. Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party
Coalitions. Oxford University Press, New York.
Manza, J., Hout, M., Brooks, C., 1995. Class voting in capitalist democracies since World war II:
dealignment, realignment, or trendless ﬂuctuation? Annual Review of Sociology 21, 137–163.
Manza, J., Wright, N., 2003. Religion and political behavior. In: Michele Dillon (Ed.), Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 297–314.
McCall, L., 2001. Complex Inequality. Routledge, New York.
Mueller, C.M. (Ed.), 1988. The Politics of the Gender Gap. Sage Publications, Newbury Park.
Nieuwbeerta, P., 1995. The democratic class struggle in twenty countries, 1945–90. Ph.D thesis, University
of Nijmegen.
Nieuwbeerta, P., 1996. The democratic class struggle in postwar societies: class voting in twenty countries,
1945–1990. Acta Sociologica 39, 345–384.
Nieuwbeerta, P., De Graaf, N.D., 1999. Traditional class voting in twenty postwar societies. In: Evans, G.
(Ed.), The End of Class Politics? Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 23–58.
Nieuwbeerta, P., De Graaf, N.D., Ultee, W., 2000. Eﬀects of class mobility on class voting in post-war
western industrialized countries. European Sociological Review 16, 327–348.
Nieuwbeerta, P., Ganzeboom, H.B.G., 2000. International Social Cleavages and Politics File. Steinmetz
Archive, Amsterdam.
Norris, P., 1988. The gender gap: a cross-national trend. In: Mueller, C.M. (Ed.), The Politics of the
Gender Gap. Sage, Newbury Park, CA, pp. 217–234.
OConnor, J., Ann Orloﬀ, Sheila Shaver, 1999. States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social
Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. Cambridge University, New York.
Oskarson, M., 1992. Sweden. In: Franklin, M., et al. (Eds.), Electoral Change. Cambridge University
Press, New York, pp. 339–361.
128 C. Brooks et al. / Social Science Research 35 (2006) 88–128Page, B., Shapiro, R., 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans Policy Preference.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Pakulski, J., Waters, M., 1996. The Death of Class. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Powell, G.B., 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Przeworski, A., Sprague, J., 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Raftery, A., 1995. Bayesian Model Selection in Sociology. Sociological Methodology 25, 111–163.
Redding, K., Viterna, J., 1999. Political demands, political opportunities: explaining the diﬀerential
success of left-libertarian parties. Social Forces 78, 491–510.
Rose, R. (Ed.), 1974. Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook. Free Press, New York.
Rose, R., McAllister, I., 1986. Voters Begin to Choose: From Closed Class to Open Elections in Britain.
Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Stanley, H., Niemi, R., 1993. Partisanship and group support over time. In: Niemi, R., Weisberg, H.
(Eds.), Controversies in Voting Behavior, third ed. Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, DC,
pp. 350–367.
Wallis, R., Bruce, S., 1992. Secularization: The Orthodox Model. In: Bruce, S. (Ed.), Religion and
Modernization. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 8–30.
Weakliem, D.L., Heath, A., 1994. Rational choice and class voting. Rationality and Society 6, 243–270.
Weakliem, D.L., Heath, A., 1999. The secret life of class voting. In: Evans, G. (Ed.), The End of Class
Politics? Oxford University Press, New York.
Wong, R.S.-K., 1994. Model selection strategies and the use of association models to detect group
diﬀerences. Sociological Methods and Research 22, 460–491.
Wuthnow, R., 1988. The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Wuthnow, R., Evans, J. (Eds.), 2002. The Quiet Hand of God: The Public Role of Mainline Protestantism.
University of California Press, Berkeley.
